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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of tax-financed universal health coverage schemes on 
macroeconomic aspects of labor supply, asset holding, inequality, and welfare, while taking 
into account features common to developing economies, such as informal employment  
and tax avoidance, by constructing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with 
heterogeneous agents. Agents have different education levels, employment statuses, and 
idiosyncratic shocks. Given three tax financing options, calibration results based on the Thai 
economy suggest that the financing options matter for outcomes both at the aggregate and 
disaggregate levels. Universal health coverage, financed by labor income tax revenue,  
could reduce inequality due to its large redistributive role. Social welfare cannot be improved 
when labor decisions are endogenous and distortions are higher than the redistributive  
gains for all tax financing options. In the absence of labor supply choice, mild welfare gains 
are found. In a broader sense, the paper aims to provide a frame for policy evaluation of 
socioeconomic policies from both macro and micro perspectives, taking different social 
groups into consideration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In most developing countries, the goal of universal health coverage (UHC) is not easy 
to reach due to the fact that large, resource-poor populations have limited access to 
health services.1 Given that resource-poor people cannot afford out-of-pocket health 
expenditures, or can pay for them only by sacrificing other priorities, a health financing 
system under which people are required to pay for use directly is one of the major 
barriers to reaching UHC. Although cost sharing is necessary to prevent the 
overutilization of health services arising from the potential problem of moral hazard, 
universal coverage is more likely to be reached when the out-of-pocket ratio for direct 
payment is sufficiently low. Against this backdrop of the relationship between UHC and 
direct payment, a way to reach UHC is to lower out-of-pocket expenditure to such a 
degree that people are not likely to suffer financial hardship. 2  A cross-country 
estimation based on 59 countries by Xu et al. (2010) suggested that when the out-of-
pocket ratio is lower than 15%–20% of total health expenditure, the chance of 
individuals or households incurring financial catastrophe would be negligible.  
For policy makers faced with the agenda of UHC, issues such as how to raise related 
revenue and effectively reduce the out-of-pocket ratio are the main concerns. 
Insurance and tax revenue are in practice the two major approaches to health system 
financing, which differ by funds being pooled directly under the insurance approach and 
indirectly under the tax revenue approach. However, due to the presence of large 
informal sectors in developing countries (Schneider 2002), financing through 
compulsory wage-based health insurance contributions can only be enforced in the 
formal sector and is restricted in scale. Moreover, voluntary private health insurance 
has a limited participation rate and plays a marginal role in most developing countries 
(Drechsler and Jutting 2005).  
Alternatively, UHC schemes financed by government revenue have attained universal 
coverage effectively in developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand.  
In the case of Thailand, a UHC scheme called the Universal Coverage Scheme  
(UCS), financed through general government revenue since 2002, was implemented 
successfully to provide more effective coverage. As a result of the scheme, by 2012, 
the average out-of-pocket health expenditure ratio in Thailand had declined to 13% 
(Figure 1) and almost 100% health protection coverage had been reached. Thailand’s 
experience shows that reaching universal coverage financed by government revenue 
can be feasible.  
Besides the two financing options described above, a World Health Organization 
(2010) report discussed many other innovative methods, including foreign exchange 
transaction tax, bank account transaction tax, and various excise taxes. However, the 
applicability of some of these options has yet to be evaluated and more attention 
should be paid to existing tax-based financing schemes (Savedoff 2004). Moreover, 
there have only been a few studies related to UHC financing, and literature analyzing 
the impacts of UHC is even scarcer, especially regarding the effects from a macro 
perspective.3  
1  According to the World Health Organization (2010), UHC is defined as all people having access to 
health services and not suffering financial hardship in paying for them. 
2  The World Health Organization emphasizes that among all UHC issues, it is most critical to develop a 
health financing system that can effectively remove the financial barriers to health service access. 
3  A few studies look at the impact on labor markets from a partial equilibrium perspective, such as 
Aterido, Hallward–Driemeier, and Pages (2011) and Wagstaff and Manachotphong (2012).  
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Figure 1: Health Expenditure and Out-of-Pocket Ratio in Thailand 
(%) 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, LHS = left-hand scale, RHS = right-hand scale.  
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
This paper tries to fill the research gap by exploring the following questions. First, what 
is the impact on individuals in terms of their optimal decisions for labor supply and 
asset holdings? Second, what are the impacts on inequality and social welfare? Third, 
what are the different impacts at both the aggregate and disaggregate levels? To 
quantitatively answer these questions, the paper adopts a modern dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium framework, which is being increasingly used for the study of social 
security and public finance. Broadly, the paper aims to provide a rigid framework for 
evaluating such socioeconomic policies that can help policy makers to understand the 
impacts across different social groups, as well as the aggregated outcomes.  
In a model economy, there are heterogeneous agents who have different employment 
statuses over time, a government that collects revenue and spends on the provision of 
social security and has other expenditures, and firms that employ labor and capital for 
producing goods in a competitive environment. While facing income and expenditure 
risks, individual agents of differing ages and levels of education make their decisions 
on labor and consumption. UHC is modeled by a lowering of the out-of-pocket ratio, 
since financing is one of the most important aspects. The calibrated exercise is based 
on the Thai economy using both micro household survey panel data and macro 
indicators. Micro household data from the Thai Household Socio-Economic Panel 
Survey 2005–2007, including 6,000 households and more than 20,000 individuals, are 
used to estimate the value and shocks of health expenditure and transitions of 
employment, while the other key macro indicators are taken or estimated as targets of 
the benchmark model.  
This study is closely related to studies on health insurance such as those by Jeske and 
Kitao (2009) and Hsu (2012), but differs by focusing on tax-based UHC and allowing 
workers to transition to different sectors, which causes efficiency and tax differences.4  
It is also related to studies of labor supply (and social security) such as Heckman 
4  Other related literature includes Kotlikoff (1986), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994). 
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(1993), Saez (2002), Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2009), and Kitao (2014). Extending  
from Hsu, Huang, and Yupho (2014), this paper allows for endogenous labor decisions 
and a more comprehensive social security structure. The paper targets income 
distributions at both the aggregate level and the disaggregate level, while recognizing 
the efficiency differences that arise due to differences between sectors and differing 
levels of education.  
2. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Agents in the economy are endowed with one of two types of education (low and high) 
and go through their life cycle from young to old. When they are young, they are 
endowed with one unit of labor time at each period, but face unemployment risk. If they 
work, they are employed in either the formal sector or the informal one. All young, 
working agents face idiosyncratic efficiency risks that cannot be insured. In addition, 
both young and old agents face health expenditure risks that can only be partially 
insured. The government collects consumption tax, capital income tax, labor income 
tax, and social security contributions. Among them, the labor income tax and social 
security contributions are assumed to be collected only in the formal sector. The fiscal 
outlays of government include pension payments, public health expenditure, social 
assistance, and other government expenditure. This section describes features of the 
benchmark economy. 
2.1 Demographics  
The population consists of working young and retired old people. Young agents retire 
with probability 𝜋𝑜  and old agents die with probability 𝜋𝑑  in each period, and such 
probabilities are assumed not to vary by education level or sector. When an old agent 
dies in a period, a newborn young agent replaces the old one at the beginning of the 
same period, so that the measure of the entire population remains the same. 
2.2 Individuals 
Each agent is endowed with one type of education that does not change over  
the individual’s lifetime. Meanwhile, agents face the following individual shocks: 
employment status shocks (determining whether agents have a chance to work  
and, if so, in which sector), individual productivity idiosyncratic shocks, and health 
expenditure shocks. 
2.2.1 Education  
The shares of high education and low education in the population are 𝜆 and 1 − 𝜆. We 
denote education type by 𝑒, of which the set is given by 
𝑒 = �ℎ, high education
𝑙, low education   (1) 
It is assumed that the education difference imposes education-specific efficiencies 𝜀𝑒 
permanently on the agents as part of their individual labor efficiency. 
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2.2.2 Employment Status Shock 
Young agents face employment status shocks. They have a chance of either working 
or being unemployed. When they work, they have a chance of being either in the 
formal sector or the informal sector. The formal sector is defined as an economic sector 
in which labor income is taxed, social security contributions are collected accordingly, 
and related social security benefits are provided upon contribution. In contrast, the 
informal sector is characterized by tax avoidance and nonparticipation in some social 
security programs. We denote employment status as 𝑗, of which the set is 
𝑗 = � 𝑓, formal sector𝑛𝑓, informal sector
𝑢𝑚, unemployed.   (2) 
Such status shocks evolve stochastically via N-state Markov chains, Π𝑒. Meanwhile, 
sectors are assumed to be associated with sector-specific efficiencies, 𝜀𝑗, and agents’ 
total individual labor efficiencies are affected accordingly when they transit from one 
sector to another. 
2.2.3 Individual Productivity Shock 
The individual labor efficiencies of working young agents are jointly affected by their 
endowed education-specific efficiencies, 𝜖𝑒 , sector-specific efficiencies related to the 
sector where they work, 𝜀𝑗, and time-varying education-dependent idiosyncratic shocks, 
𝜂𝑒, evolving stochastically via education-dependent Markov chains, 𝛹𝑒, with each state 
value taken from given finite sets, 𝑄𝑒. Therefore, the natural logarithm of total individual 
labor efficiency, 𝑧, is determined by 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑧) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜖𝑒) + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜀𝑗) + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜂𝑒) (3) 
As agents do not change their education type over their life cycle, 𝜖𝑒 is constant once 
they are endowed with one type of education. The variation of labor efficiency, 
therefore, comes from the transitions of employment status, 𝜀𝑗 , and idiosyncratic 
shocks, 𝜂𝑒.  
2.2.4 Health Expenditure Shock 
Regardless of the differences across education type and sector, all agents face  
the uncertainty of age-dependent health expenditures caused by health expenditure 
shocks, 𝑥𝑡, where 
𝑡 = �𝑦, young𝑜, old.   (4) 
The health expenditure shocks, 𝑥𝑡 , take the values from given finite sets, 𝑋𝑡 , and 
evolve stochastically via Markov chains, Ω𝑡 . The ratios of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure are denoted by 𝜔𝑡. 
2.3 Preference and Production 
A utility preference function including both consumption and leisure is defined as 
𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑐,𝑛) (5) 
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where 𝑐 is the individual consumption and 𝑛 the amount of individual labor supply in 
each period. 
 
Requiring both inputs of labor and capital, the production function is written as 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) (6) 
where 𝐴 is the total factor productivity, 𝐾  is the aggregate capital per capita in the 
economy, and 𝐿 is the effective labor per capita employed by the firms. The capital is 
assumed to be homogenous across sectors and all markets behave competitively. 
2.4 Government  
2.4.1 Tax Revenue and Social Security Contribution  
The government collects a consumption tax, 𝑇𝑐(𝑐) , a capital income tax, 𝑇𝑘(𝑘) ,  
wage-based social security contributions, 𝑇𝑠𝑐(𝑤𝑧𝑛) , and a labor income tax, 𝑇𝑙(𝑦) , 
where the taxable labor income, 𝑦, is the net labor income after the deduction of social 
security contribution, denoted by 𝑦 = 𝑤𝑧𝑛 − 𝑇𝑠𝑐(𝑤𝑧𝑛). Regarding the tax revenues or 
social security contributions above, the corresponding rates are 𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑙, and 𝜏𝑠𝑐.  
In the context of the economy with an informal sector where the collection of tax  
is constrained by economic informality, the wage-based labor income tax, 𝑇𝑙(𝑦), and 
the social security contributions, 𝑇𝑠𝑐(𝑤𝑧𝑛), are assumed to be only enforced in the 
formal sector.  
2.4.2 Social Security Expenditure 
The government provides old-age pension benefits,𝑇𝑅𝑝𝑏 , to entitled agents who 
contribute to a pension pool when they work in the formal sector. It also provides social 
protection, 𝑇𝑅𝑐 , where a minimum consumption level is guaranteed. In addition, for 
people who previously worked in the formal sector before encountering unemployment 
shocks, the government assists them with an unemployment benefit, 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑏.  
A contribution-based health care scheme is provided to workers in the formal sector.  
In order to reach universal health coverage, the government also runs a universal 
coverage scheme to lower out-of-pocket health expenditure for informal workers and 
nonworkers (retired people) to a level comparable to the formal workers’ scheme. 
Financed directly by the government budget, an increase of the public health 
expenditure (1 −𝜔𝑦)𝑥𝑦 + (1 −𝜔𝑜)𝑥𝑜 lowers the private out-of-pocket ratios, facilitating 
easier access to health services for all people and helping to achieve universal  
health coverage.  
2.4.3 Budget Balance  
Assuming that the government balances the budget at each period, the government 
budget balance is denoted by 
𝑇𝑅 = 𝐺, (7) 
where 
𝑇𝑅 = ∫{𝑇𝑐(𝑐) + 𝑇𝑘(𝑘 + 𝑏) + 𝑇𝑙(𝑦) + 𝑇𝑠𝑐(𝑤𝑧𝑛)}𝑑Φ(𝑠) + 𝐷′, and  
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𝐺 = ��𝑇𝑅𝑝𝑏 + 𝑇𝑅𝑐 + 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑏 + (1 −𝜔𝑦)𝑥𝑦 + (1 −𝜔𝑜)𝑥𝑜�𝑑Φ(𝑠) + 𝐷(1 + 𝑟) + 𝐺𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 
should be satisfied at each and every period.  
In Equation (7), the left side, 𝑇𝑅, is the fiscal revenue that the government collects from 
the entire economy, including the tax revenues and social security contributions 
mentioned above. In addition, 𝐷ʹ is the debt issued in the current period and is part of 
government revenue. For the collection of capital income tax revenue, 𝑏 is a lump sum 
transfer of accidental bequests collected from the decedent and redistributed to all 
survivors, which is written as follows: 
𝑏′ = ∫𝜋𝑑𝑘′d 𝛷(𝑠) (8) 
As for capital, the bequest is taxed accordingly. 𝛷(𝑠)  is the distribution of the 
population over a state space 𝑠, where  𝑠 = (𝑒,𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑗−1, 𝑧, 𝑥𝑡). 
The total government fiscal outlays on the right-hand side, 𝐺 , consist of the 
aforementioned social security payments, redemption of debt, and other government 
expenditure. 𝐷 is the one-period debt issued in the previous period and is assumed to 
be fully redeemed with an interest payment at a rate of 𝑟 . 𝐺𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠  is the sum of 
spending that includes all other government expenditure. 
2.5 Agents’ Problems 
Given the state for an agent with education 𝑒 and age 𝑡, and the expectation through 
transition probabilities for individual efficiency and health expenditure, the agents’ 
problems are written as follows: 
𝑉𝑡(𝑠) = �max �𝐸�𝑢(𝑐,𝑛) + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝑜)𝐸�𝑉𝑦(𝑠′)|𝑠� + 𝜋𝑜𝐸[𝑉𝑜(𝑠′)|𝑠]��   𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑦max�𝐸{𝑢(𝑐,𝑛) + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋𝑑)𝐸[𝑉𝑜(𝑠′)|𝑠]}�   𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑜   (9) 
subject to (1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐 + 𝑘ʹ = 𝑊𝑒𝑙 + 𝑇𝑅𝑐  (10) 
𝑘ʹ ≥ 0  (11) 
where 
𝑊𝑒𝑙 ≡
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑤𝑧𝑛 + (1 + 𝑟(1 − 𝜏𝑘))𝑘 − 𝑇𝑠𝑐(𝑤𝑧𝑛) − 𝑇𝑙(𝑦) −𝜔𝑦𝑥𝑦, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 𝑓 
𝑤𝑧𝑛 + (1 + 𝑟(1 − 𝜏𝑘))𝑘 − 𝜔𝑦𝑥𝑦, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 𝑛𝑓
�1 + 𝑟(1 − 𝜏𝑘)�𝑘 − 𝜔𝑦𝑥𝑦 + �𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚   𝑖𝑓 𝑗−1 = 𝑓 0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 𝑢𝑚
𝑝𝑠 + �1 + 𝑟(1 − 𝜏𝑘)�𝑘 − 𝜔𝑜𝑥𝑜, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑜,
   (12) 
and 
𝑇𝑅𝑐 ≡ max {(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐 −𝑊𝑒𝑙, 0} (13) 
𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚 ≡ 𝜏𝑢𝑚 ∫𝑤𝑧𝑛 𝑑Φ(𝑠𝑒)  (14) 
𝑝𝑠 ≡ 𝜏𝑝𝑠(Ξ)∫𝑤𝑧𝑛 𝑑Φ(𝑠𝑒)  (15) 
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In the value function, Equation (9), the future value is discounted by a discount factor, 
𝛽, and is a weighted average of the conditional expectations of young and old agents 
for the problem of young agents, where the retirement probability, 𝜋𝑜, serves as the 
weight. Regarding the problem for old agents, the future value is discounted by the 
discount factor after adjustment of the survival probability. Equation (10) is the budget 
constraint and the total resource for allocation where the resource comes from the net 
wealth, Wel, and the transfer for the social consumption insurance, 𝑇𝑅𝑐, conditionally. 
Regarding 𝑊𝑒𝑙 in Equation (12), working young agents in the formal sector have labor 
income and accrued capital income, pay all kinds of taxes, and make social security 
contributions, as shown in the first row, where 𝜔𝑦  and 𝑥𝑦  are the out-of-pocket 
expenditure ratio and the total health expenditure for young agents. The second row 
indicates the avoidance of labor tax and social security contributions in the informal 
sector, and unemployed young agents who do not have labor income and may receive 
unemployment benefits, depending on their previous employment status, are specified 
in the third row. Finally, the fourth row defines the wealth of old agents, where 𝑝𝑠 is 
their pension benefit and 𝜔𝑜𝑥𝑜 is their out-of-pocket health expenditure. 
Equation (13) gives the definition of 𝑇𝑅𝑐. As shown in Equations (14) and (15), the 
unemployment benefit, 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚 , and the pension payment, 𝑝𝑠 , are percentages of  
the average labor income of each education group. Furthermore, as shown in 
Equation (15), the replacement rate, 𝜏𝑝𝑠(𝛯), is a function of the contribution time, 𝛯. 
2.6 Competitive Equilibrium 
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium consists of a set of quantities {𝑐,𝑘ʹ,𝑛,𝑊𝑒𝑙} for each young individual and each old individual with either high or low 
education, in the formal or informal sector respectively, a set of prices {𝑤, 𝑟} 
determined by the aggregate capital per capita, 𝐾 , and the labor per capita, 𝐿 , 
government policies {𝜏𝑐 , 𝜏𝑘 , 𝜏𝑙 , 𝜏𝑠𝑐 , 𝜏𝑢𝑚, 𝜏𝑝𝑠(𝛯),𝜔𝑦,𝜔𝑜, 𝑐}, and a stationary distribution of 
the population over the state space 𝛷(𝑠) which is characterized by 
(i) shares of the population differing by education, which are 𝜆 and 1 − 𝜆; 
(ii) a retirement probability, 𝜋𝑜, and a death probability, 𝜋𝑑; 
(iii) an individual efficiency, 𝑧 , caused by education efficiencies, 𝜀𝑒 , sector 
efficiencies, 𝜀𝑗, and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, 𝜂𝑒, with values from 𝑄𝑒 
evolved with transition probability matrixes 𝛹𝑒; and 
(iv) health expenditure shocks, 𝑥𝑡 , with values from 𝑋𝑡  evolved with transition 
probability matrixes Ω𝑡, 
such that 
(i) agents with high and low education, from the formal and informal sectors, and 
the unemployed, at young and old ages, solve their respective individual 
constrained maximization problems; 
(ii) firms solve the profit maximization problem; 
(iii) the resource feasibility condition, 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 , is satisfied, where 
𝐼 = 𝐾ʹ − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾 and 𝑋 = ∫ 𝑥𝑑𝛷(𝑠); 
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(iv) government policies satisfy the government budget constraint Equation (7); 
and 
(v) both the labor and capital markets clear when 𝐿 = ∫ 𝑧𝑛 𝑑𝛷(𝑠)  and  
𝐾 = ∫𝑘 𝑑𝛷(𝑠), which integrates 𝜆 and 1 − 𝜆 shares of the population with high 
and low education in terms of asset holdings and labor supply. 
3. CALIBRATION 
Function forms, blocks of parameters, and key features of the model are presented in 
this section. The function forms include the household utility, firm production, worker 
efficiency, and pension benefit replacement rate. Utilizing panel data from the Thai 
Household Socio-Economic Panel Survey 2005–2007 and various other sources, this 
section introduces the details of referred and estimated parameters used in the model, 
while pointing out other parameters for calibration targets that are adopted in the 
benchmark economy. 
3.1 Preference and Production 
A non-separable consumption–leisure utility function, 𝑢(𝑐,𝑛) , compatible with a 
balanced growth path, is assumed in the economy. It is written as 
𝑢(𝑐,𝑛) = [𝑐𝜙(1−𝑛)1−𝜙](1−𝜇)
1−𝜇
 (16) 
where 𝜙 determines the choice between consumption and leisure. 𝜇 determines the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the consumption–leisure bundle and is related 
to the risk aversion. Such risk aversion, 𝛾, as derived by Healthcote, Storesletten, and 
Violante (2008), is given by 
𝛾 = 1 − 𝜙 + 𝜙𝜇 (17) 
A continuum of firms in a competitive goods market is homogenous and assumed to 
follow a Cobb–Douglas production function for both sectors as 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼 (18) 
The two factor prices derived from the firm optimization problem are as follows: 
𝑤 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿−𝛼 (19) 
𝑟 = 𝛼𝐴𝐾𝛼−1𝐿(1−𝛼) − 𝛿  (20) 
where the capital depreciates at a rate of 𝛿 in each period and its income share is 
indicated by 𝛼. 
The model period is annual and the discount factor, 𝛽, in the agents’ problem, Equation 
(9), is adjusted to match the capital–output ratio of 3.4. The utility parameter, 𝜙, targets 
the social average working hours of 1/3, and 𝜇 is set to target a medium value of risk 
aversion of 2. In the production function, the total factor productivity, 𝐴, is normalized to 
be unitary. The capital income share, 𝛼, follows the estimated value of 0.3144 in Ahuja, 
Peungchanchaikul, and Piyagarn (2004), and the annual capital depreciation rate, 𝛿, is 
estimated from the data at 5.2%. 
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3.2 Demographics and Education 
The retirement probability, 𝜋𝑜 , is set at a value indicating that young agents are 
expected to work for 45 years, and the death probability, 𝜋𝑑, is chosen so that the 
dependency ratio of old over young people is 13%. Tertiary education (including 
vocational school) and above is defined as “high education” while secondary school 
and below are defined as “low education,” accounting for 25% and 75% of the 
workforce, respectively, estimated from the data. Such shares are denoted by 𝜆 and 1 − 𝜆 in the model.  
The shares of the working population in the informal sector and the formal sector are 
jointly determined by the transition matrixes and the shares of the population with 
different levels of education. We assume there is a transitory bias as a result of the 
short period of the panel, of which the parameter is used to target the labor force share, 
given that 62% of them work in the informal sector. Further, we calibrate the permanent 
efficiency gap parameters, 𝜖𝑒, as a result of the education difference in Equation (3) by 
targeting the Gini coefficient of 0.394 (the Gini coefficient of Thailand in 2010 according 
to World Bank estimates). As the efficiencies 𝜖𝑒 (𝜖ℎ and 𝜖𝑙) are in relative terms, the 
former is normalized and the latter is calibrated accordingly.  
3.3 Employment and Sector Transition 
Agents are subject to employment shocks that cause working agents to be in the 
formal sector, the informal sector, or unemployed. Markov-chain transition probability 
matrixes are constructed from the Household Socio-Economic Panel Survey data with 
three employment statuses and corresponding transition probabilities (Table 1).  
The transitory sector efficiencies 𝜀𝑗 (𝜀𝑓 and 𝜀𝑛𝑓 ; the value is zero when unemployed) 
are used to target the sector’s shares of output, where the output of the informal  
sector accounts for 44%. 5  In the same fashion as 𝜖𝑒 , we only calibrate 𝜀𝑛𝑓  while 
normalizing 𝜀𝑓.  
Table 1: Transition Probabilities of Employment Status 
High Education  
 
Formal Informal Unemployed 
Formal  0.7058 0.2652 0.0290 
Informal 0.7356 0.2364 0.0280 
Unemployed  0.6940 0.2715 0.0345 
Low Education 
 
Formal Informal Unemployed 
Formal  0.3678 0.6065 0.0257 
Informal 0.2119 0.7589 0.0292 
Unemployed  0.3294 0.6706 0.0000 
Sources: Thai Household Socio-Economic Panel Survey; authors’ calculations, transitory bias adjusted. 
5  As estimated in National Economic and Social Development Board and National Statistical Office of 
Thailand (2004). 
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3.4 Individual Productivity, Sector, and Education Efficiency 
For Equation (3), of which the calibration targets 𝜖𝑒  and 𝜀𝑗  have been described in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3, the remaining idiosyncratic shock, 𝜂𝑒, is assumed to follow an 
AR(1) process written as ln𝜂𝑒 = 𝜌𝑒ln𝜂𝑒ʹ + 𝜁𝑒 (21) 
where 𝜁𝑒 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎𝑒2).  
The persistence parameters of AR(1) 𝜌𝑒 are assumed to be the same across education 
and the estimates of Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) of 0.95 for both high- and 
low-education groups are used.6 Therefore, we calibrate two values of the standard 
error 𝜎𝑒 (𝜎ℎ and 𝜎𝑙, respectively) by targeting Gini coefficients of wage income in each 
education group. Estimated from the same data, the Gini coefficients of wage income 
for groups with high and low levels of education are 0.434 and 0.381, respectively.  
As labor supply is endogenous in the model, the corresponding wage income  
inequality is jointly determined by endogenous labor hours, the product of total 
individual efficiency, 𝜀𝑒𝜀𝑗𝜂𝑒, the social wage rate, and labor hours. The AR(1) process 
of Equation (21) is then approximated by a five-state Markov chain using the method of 
Tauchen (1986). 
3.5 Health Expenditure Shocks 
To parameterize health expenditure shocks for young and old agents, Hsu, Huang, and 
Yupho (2014) calibrated directly from the Household Socio-Economic Panel Survey 
panel data following the method of Jeske and Kitao (2009). Each process is simplified 
with only two states, including “low” and “high” for the lower 95% and top 5% of the 
health expenditure distribution. The health expenditure for young agents 𝑋𝑦 and old 
agents 𝑋𝑜 is stated relative to the average social wage, and evolves via the transition 
probabilities Ω𝑦  and Ω𝑜 , respectively. We follow the same method and refer to the 
values estimated by Hsu, Huang, and Yupho (2014).  
3.6 Social Security System 
The Thai social security system includes old-age pension, social insurance, 
unemployment, and health coverage schemes. This subsection elaborates on such 
social security tiers.  
Unemployment benefit. Unemployed young agents are entitled to unemployment 
benefits if they worked in the formal sector in the period before becoming unemployed. 
In practice, an unemployed person receives 50% of his or her average salary over  
the past 5 years for 6 months. 7  Given the annual frequency of the model, the 
unemployment benefit ratio, 𝜏𝑢𝑚, is set at 25% of the average labor income during the 
first period of unemployment and the agent does not receive further benefits if the 
unemployment status carries on after the first period. 
6  As both 𝜌𝑒  and 𝜁𝑒  can be used to target the within-group Gini coefficient, the alternative setting of 
calibrating 𝜌𝑒  while standardizing 𝜁𝑒  does not affect the results. The estimation of persistence would 
only be possible for panel data with a longer time horizon.  
7  To avoid the exponential computational cost to track the five-period history, instead of calculating the  
5-year average labor income explicitly, we approximate it by the education-dependent cross-sectional 
average value. 
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Social insurance. The government provides social insurance for minimum 
consumption, which agents in the economy can receive if their own net wealth is below 
a predetermined level. The amount of consumption subsidy—the difference between 
minimum consumption and net wealth—is estimated from the data at 8.45% in terms of 
the social average wage in the model. 
Old-age pension. In addition, workers who have contributed to the social security pool 
while working in the formal sector are also entitled to old-age pension benefits once 
they retire. The pension benefit is a percentage, 𝜏𝑝𝑠 , of the education-dependent 
average labor income of the last 5 years.8 The formula of the replacement rate in 
Thailand, 𝜏𝑝𝑠, is as follows (Pfau and Atisophon 2009): 
𝜏𝑝𝑠(𝛯) = 1.5𝛯−2.5100  (22) 
where 𝛯 represents the number of years of contributions to the pension system.  
Agents are assumed to contribute to the pay-as-you-go old-age pension system when 
they are in the formal sector. As the shock of employment is transitory, all agents work 
in the formal sector for some time, either longer or shorter. As suggested by the 
stationary values of the transition matrix for employment in Table 1, a worker with high 
education has a higher probability of working in the formal sector. As a result, given 
that the expected working years of young agents are the same, the value of 𝛯 is higher 
for agents with high education compared with low education.  
Health care schemes. Before the implementation of the Universal Coverage Scheme 
(UCS), social security participation was limited to workers in the formal sector based  
on a contribution–benefit principle. With the implementation of the UCS financed by 
general tax revenue, workers in the informal sector and all retirees, who were not 
entitled otherwise, could be covered with a lower out-of-pocket ratio. The aggregate  
flat out-of-pocket ratio is used for the approximation of actual ratios. The ratios of  
out-of-pocket health expenditure for the young generation and the old generation, 𝜔𝑡, 
as a percentage of total expenditure on health, are set at a uniform rate of 14% after 
the implementation of the UCS. Prior to the UCS, the ratio for the formal workers was 
the same as afterward, while the ratio was set at 37% for the previously less insured 
group. Total health expenditure is 4% of gross domestic product (GDP).  
Social security contributions and others. The contribution rate, 𝜏𝑠𝑐, is 10%, the sum 
of contributions from employers and employees in the economy. The model tries to 
capture those pillar schemes while simplifying the existing social security system in  
the Thai economy. The simplifications include the following: (i) some features of 
benefits calculations have been deliberately left out, such as benefit minimums and 
caps; (ii) other tiers of social security, such as maternity and work injury, are also not 
included in the model since they play a relatively minor role; and (iii) other secondary 
pension schemes are also not part of the model.  
3.7 Government Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure 
Government revenue consists of consumption tax, capital income tax, labor income 
tax, and social security contributions. Following Diaz–Gimenez and Diaz–Saavedra 
(2009), we calibrate three tax rates, including 𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑙, and 𝜏𝑘, by targeting the shares of 
the corresponding tax revenues in the percentages of GDP. In addition, social security 
8  The value is approximated by the cross-section average for the same reason as the calculation of the 
unemployment benefit. 
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contributions paid by workers in the formal sector are collected by the government as 
revenue, of which the rate is denoted by 𝜏𝑠𝑐.  
Government fiscal outlays include all kinds of social security expenditure, interest 
payment, and government consumption. The government issues bonds, which are 
assumed to be held only for one period, replacing the existing debt while keeping the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, 𝐷/𝑌, constant. Given such a simplification, only interest payments 
occur. In the benchmark economy, government consumption,𝐺 , is endogenously 
determined to balance the government budget. Social security expenditures such as 
old-age pension, unemployed benefit, social assistance, and public health expenditure 
are determined by the policy choices of 𝜏𝑢𝑚 ,𝜏𝑝𝑠(𝛯) , 𝜔𝑡 , 𝜏𝑐  and other endogenous 
variables jointly. 
The details of both the estimated parameters and calibration targets are included in 
Appendix 1 for further reference. We conclude this section by summarizing the 
parameters of the values to be calibrated in the following section. Such parameters 
consist of the discount factor, 𝛽 , the utility parameters, 𝜙  and 𝜇 , the demographic 
parameters, 𝜋𝑜  and 𝜋𝑑 , the education- and sector-specific efficiency parameters, 𝜖𝑒 
and 𝜖𝑗, the standard deviations of idiosyncratic shocks, 𝜎𝑒 , and the tax rates, 𝜏𝑐 , 𝜏𝑙 ,  
and 𝜏𝑘 . In addition, 𝜏𝑝𝑠(𝛯)  is determined by 𝛯 , which depends on the Markov-chain 
stationary distribution of the employment transition matrixes.  
4. ANALYSIS 
In this section, the constructed benchmark economy is described focusing on 
comparison of actual benchmark values and targeted values. The analyses focus on 
the steady-state equilibrium. Firstly, a benchmark economy with a UCS is calibrated 
with key targets being matched to the data of the Thai economy, assuming government 
consumption to balance the government budget. All the non-ratio values are in real 
terms, rather than nominal terms. The target values have been chosen based on the 
average values after 2007, which is the period after full implementation of the UCS.  
To investigate the effects of the UCS, this paper conducts simulations of removing the 
UCS, in which the out-of-pocket ratio of workers in the informal sector and all old 
people is raised back to the pre-UCS level. The results under different tax financing 
options are compared with the benchmark economy, including the impacts on various 
dimensions such as labor supply, asset holdings, social welfare, and inequality. The 
computation procedure is presented in Appendix 3.  
4.1 Benchmark Economy 
Table 2 shows the key features of such a benchmark economy, with closely matching 
calibration targets representing various key features of the Thai economy. For instance, 
the capital–output ratio and health expenditure–output ratio are 3.4042 and 3.99%, 
respectively, given the targets of 3.4 and 4.0%. The Gini coefficients of the benchmark 
economy are only slightly higher than the calibration targets, at 0.4371, 0.3832,  
and 0.3965 compared with 0.4340, 0.3810, and 0.3940 for the within-group and 
economy-wide Gini coefficients. The details of such calibration targets are contained  
in Appendix 1.  
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Table 2: Key Economic Features of the Benchmark Economy 
Name  Calibration Target Benchmark Value 
Capital–output ratio  3.4000 3.4042 
Total health expenditure–output ratio  4.00% 3.99% 
Risk aversion of utility function 2.0000 2.0000 
Aggregate labor hours per worker 1/3 0.3344 
Working years  45 45 
Old-age dependency ratio  13% 13% 
Informal sector size (% of workforce) 62% 62% 
Informal sector output (% of total output) 44.00% 44.90% 
Gini coefficient for labor income (high education) 0.4340 0.4371 
Gini coefficient for labor income (low education) 0.3810 0.3832 
Gini coefficient for income (social average) 0.3940 0.3965 
Labor income tax (% of GDP) 2.20% 2.18% 
Capital tax (% of GDP) 5.40% 5.47% 
Consumption tax (% of GDP) 10.80% 10.79% 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Thailand; National Economic and Social Development Board, Thailand; World Bank; 
United Nations; authors’ calculations. 
Parameters of the benchmark economy are included in Table 3 as an overview. In 
addition to the parameters described in the previous section, the calibrated values of 
the remaining parameters are set as follows: 𝛽 is 0.9040 as a result of calibrating the 
capital–output ratio of 3.4000; 𝜇 and 𝜙 are given by 3.5510 and 0.3920 for labor hours 
and risk aversion; and 𝜋𝑜 and 𝜋𝑑 are set at 0.2220 and 0.1790, for which young agents 
work for 45 years on average and the old-age dependency ratio is determined at 13%. 
Given the values of 0.7273 and 0.7000, the education- and sector-specific efficiencies, 
𝜖𝑙 and 𝜖𝑛𝑓, could help to target the economy-wide Gini coefficient of 0.3940 and the 
output share of the informal sector of 44.00%, respectively. Finally, the tax rates, 𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑙, 
and 𝜏𝑘, which are 16%, 6.4%, and 35%, are also calibrated to match the tax revenue 
shares of 2.2%, 5.4%, and 10.8%, accordingly.  
Table 3: Parameters of the Benchmark Economy 
Parameter Value Description 
Households 
  𝛽 0.9040 Discount factor 
𝜇 3.5510 Utility parameter 
𝜙 0.3920 Consumption–leisure parameter 
𝜋𝑜 0.2220 Retirement probability 
𝜋𝑑 0.1709 Death probability 
𝜔𝑡 0.1400 Out-of-pocket ratio 
𝜆 0.2500 Share of high-education group 
𝜖ℎ 1.0000 Education-specific efficiency (high education), normalized 
𝜖𝑙 0.7273 Education-specific efficiency (low education) 
𝜌𝑒 0.9500 AR(1) persistence
a  
𝜎ℎ 0.2230 AR(1) standard deviation (high education) 
𝜎𝑙 0.1790 AR(1) standard deviation (low education) 
continued next page 
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Table 3 continued 
Parameter Value Description 
Firms 
  𝛼 0.3144 Capital income shareb  
𝛿 0.0520 Depreciation rate 
𝐴 1.0000 Total factor productivity 
𝜀𝑓 1.0000 Sector-specific efficiency (formal sector), normalized 
𝜀𝑛𝑓 0.7000 Sector-specific efficiency (informal sector) 
Government 
 𝜏𝑐 0.1600 Consumption tax rate  
𝜏𝑙 0.0640 Labor income tax rate  
𝜏𝑘 0.3500 Corporate income tax rate  
𝜏𝑠𝑐 0.1000 Social security contribution rate 
𝜏𝑢𝑚 0.2500 Unemployment benefit 
𝜏𝑐 0.0845 Minimum consumption transfer of social average wage 
𝜏𝑝𝑠 Eq. (22) Pension benefit replacement rate  
𝐷/𝑌 0.4300 Public debt ratio 
a Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995). 
b Ahuja, Peungchanchaikul, and Piyagarn (2004). 
The benchmark model is closed by choosing government consumption to be 
endogenously determined. With government consumption at 14.01% of GDP, the 
government balances the budget accounting for 22.22% of GDP. The endogenous 
interest rate is 4.03% and the wage rate is 1.2027, serving as the factor prices for 
capital and labor. More details of the benchmark economy can be found in Column 1 of 
Appendix 2, Table A2.1. 
4.2 Tax-Based Financing Options 
In a real-world economy, general revenue, rather than earmarked financial resources, 
is often used to finance the public health expenditure arising from a universal  
health coverage (UHC) scheme. However, from a policy-making perspective, it might 
be more relevant to examine the effects given a specific financing option. In the model 
economy described above, the government revenue comes from various sources such 
as labor income tax, consumption tax, and capital income tax. We examine each of 
these separately.  
The benchmark economy in section 4.1 implements a tax-financed UHC scheme 
through which the informal and old-age agents can access health care with a lower  
out-of-pocket ratio, financed by government revenue. In this subsection, through 
counterfactual experiments of removing the coverage scheme, three corresponding 
economies derived from the benchmark are constructed to examine different financing 
scenarios.9  
  
9  Social security contribution is equivalent to labor income tax for its tax effect, and the debt–GDP ratio is 
assumed to be constant, which prevents the government from raising revenue through issuing 
additional debt. Accordingly, we do not give further analysis for these two options. 
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Figure 2: Financing the Cost of Universal Health Coverage 
(%) 
 
When the labor income tax is assumed to finance the expenditure in a UHC economy, 
counterfactually, the labor income tax rate falls from 6.40% to 3.82% if no such 
coverage scheme is implemented.10 If the consumption tax is assumed to finance the 
scheme, the financial cost is more equally shared across different social groups. 
Thanks to a larger tax base, the change of the consumption tax rate is less, falling from 
16.00% to 14.80%, with the removal of the scheme. Finally, removal of the health 
coverage scheme makes the capital income tax rate fall from 35.00% to 30.65% if the 
capital income tax is assumed for the purpose of financing (the details of these 
economies are shown in Appendix 2, Table A2.1, columns 2–4).  
In other words, given the incumbent tax structure, increasing the labor income tax rate 
for formal workers by 2.58% (the tax rate difference with and without the universal 
coverage scheme), or consumption tax by 1.20%, or capital income tax by 4.35% is 
required to finance the health coverage scheme in order for the government to balance 
its budget (Figure 2).  
4.3 Labor Supply and Asset Holding  
To meet the financing needs of the UHC scheme, three taxes can be chosen to 
balance the government budget, as mentioned above. However, their effects can differ 
at both the macro and individual levels through different transmission channels. We 
solve the model numerically and track the decision rules and distributions, which 
enables us to examine an individual agent’s behavior in terms of consumption, labor, 
and asset holdings at each state space. For simplicity of expression, this section 
describes the patterns of labor supply and asset holdings after grouping individuals 
according to their education type and sector status. On top of that, the macro-
aggregated values are also examined.  
Labor supply. In the absence of a universal coverage scheme, a large portion of the 
population, including informal workers and elderly people, need to self-finance higher 
out-of-pocket health expenditures. Therefore, precautionary saving against larger 
expenditure shocks comes into play, which they take into account in their consumer–
leisure decisions.  
10  As the effect of general equilibrium influences the levels of health expenditure and government 
consumption in the very short run, we fix both expenditures at the values instead of ratios at the 
alternative economies to prevent such short-run adjustment.  
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In the benchmark economy where such a coverage scheme is provided, in contrast, we 
find a UHC economy could discourage labor supply at the aggregate level when it is 
financed by labor income tax and consumption tax, but encourages labor supply when 
it is financed by capital income tax. As shown in Table 4, the negative impact of labor 
income tax financing is similar to, but slightly less than, consumption tax (–0.51% 
compared with –0.60%), taking into account the shares of the working population in the 
formal and informal sectors for different education groups. Capital income tax, 
however, has a positive impact by increasing the labor supply, with a relatively small 
0.12% increase in aggregation. 
At the disaggregate level, the results are consistent with the literature that labor income 
tax has the highest distortion for the labor supply. We find that in the formal sector, 
where the labor income tax is enforced, labor supply is discouraged more than with the 
less-distortive consumption tax. Agents with low education are especially less willing to 
work, at a reduction of 2.81%, compared with only 0.42% when the consumption tax is 
used to finance the scheme.  
It is worth noting that for the case of labor income tax financing, agents in the informal 
sector, in contrast, increase their supply of labor, especially for agents with high 
education (a 3.48% increase). Given that employment shocks are transitory, the 
forward-looking rational agents could take advantage of not being taxed when they 
work in the informal sector, foreseeing that they have to bear an increased labor 
income tax rate in the formal sector. We do not observe such a pattern when 
consumption tax or capital income tax is used.  
Table 4: Labor Supply Changes of Tax-Financed Universal Health Coverage 
  Labor Income Tax  Consumption Tax  Capital Income Tax 
All  (0.51%) (0.60%) 0.12% 
High education (0.45%) (0.51%) 0.15% 
 Formal (1.55%) (0.48%) 0.14% 
 Informal 3.48% (0.73%) 0.11% 
Low education (0.51%) (0.60%) 0.15% 
 Formal (2.81%) (0.42%) 0.15% 
 Informal 0.58% (0.68%) 0.16% 
( ) = decrease. 
From the findings above, we observe diverse impacts on the labor supply both at  
the aggregate and disaggregate levels from these tax options. At the micro level for 
working agents, their labor supplies are negatively related to asset holdings and 
positively related to productivity, and respond differently to various taxes and  
factor prices. 
Asset holdings. The changes of asset holdings turn out to be more profound than the 
changes of labor supply with a couple of distinctive patterns being observed as follows. 
First, at the aggregate level, all financing options lead to lower asset holdings since the 
provision of universal coverage dampens the need for precautionary saving. Second, 
the old generation decreases assets under all financing options and the size of the 
reduction is greater than for the young generation. Third, the financing option of labor 
income tax causes the young agents with both high and low education to hold fewer 
assets, while only young agents with low education reduce assets when the other two 
financing options apply.  
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Table 5: Asset Holding Changes by Tax-Financing Option 
  Labor Income Tax Consumption Tax Capital Income Tax 
All  (4.50%) (3.65%) (3.11%) 
High education (2.19%) (0.06%) 0.15% 
 Formal (2.39%) 0.01% 0.23% 
 Informal (1.11%) 0.24% 0.46% 
 Unemployeda (1.93%) 0.34% 0.51% 
 Unemployedb (0.59%) 0.69% 0.81% 
 Old age  (4.28%) (2.27%) (2.29%) 
Low education (5.60%) (5.38%) (4.67%) 
 Formal (6.42%) (5.12%) (4.44%) 
 Informal (5.09%) (5.24%) (4.52%) 
 Unemployeda (6.70%) (5.37%) (4.71%) 
 Unemployedb (5.45%) (5.85%) (5.13%) 
 Old age  (7.44%) (7.55%) (6.87%) 
( ) = decrease. 
a Unemployed from the formal sector. 
b Unemployed from the informal sector. 
Output. Social security schemes such as a UHC scheme financed by a certain type of 
tax revenue could affect output through a few transmission channels. First, in a partial 
equilibrium, setting holding tax constant, better social security is likely to discourage 
both labor supply and saving. Second, better insurance against expenditure shocks 
helps agents smooth their consumption more efficiently. Third, when sources of 
financing are taken into account, rising tax rates could affect individuals’ decisions as 
well. Finally, on top of these channels, the changes in wage rate and interest rate due 
to general equilibrium effects influence behavior as well. As a consequence of all the 
factors above, diverse impacts of labor supply and asset holding responding to different 
tax options, as shown in Tables 4 and 5, lead to changes of production, which is a 
function of labor and capital. Financing UHC with all three tax options results in a 
negative impact on output, largely due to declining aggregate capital. In comparison, 
among these three, capital tax could be preferred to the other two taxes, given an 
increase of labor supply and a lesser reduction of capital.  
4.4 Income Distribution  
In terms of impacts on income distribution, the three tax options to finance UHC also 
bear different implications. Regarding the impact on (total) income inequality measured 
by the Gini coefficient, the labor income tax could reduce the income Gini coefficient  
by 0.43%, as shown in the first column of Figure 3. In contrast, the consumption tax 
increases the Gini coefficient by 0.23% and capital income tax by 0.40%. Enforced in 
the formal sector where workers have higher incomes on average, the labor income tax 
has a larger redistributive effect to reduce inequality economy-wide, compared with the 
other options.  
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Figure 3: Income Gini Coefficient Changes by Tax-Financing Option 
(%) 
 
y_l = labor income; y_k = capital income. 
As there are two kinds of income—capital income for all agents who hold assets and 
labor income for agents who work—we examine the Gini coefficients for both capital 
income and labor income for the respective groups. The second to fourth columns of 
Figure 3 plot the changes in the Gini coefficients for labor income and capital income 
(for details, see Appendix 2, Table A2.1).  
Regarding the within-group changes in inequality, for all three tax options, the 
increasing tax rate leads to a higher Gini coefficient of the high-education group’s labor 
income and both groups’ capital incomes. There is a negative impact on the labor 
income Gini for the financing cases of labor income tax and capital income tax for the 
low-education group, with decreases of 0.57% and 0.05%, respectively. The most 
pronounced increases of the within-group Gini are in the capital income Gini of the low-
education group, ranging from 3.24% to 3.75% depending on the tax option. This 
within-group variation of the Gini coefficient is the consequence of individuals’ 
decisions, as mentioned in section 4.3, where each individual agent within the group 
remakes optimal decisions on work time and savings under the new circumstances of 
health expenditure coverage and tax burden.  
In this subsection, we examine the tax-financed UHC’s impacts on the income 
distributions evaluated by the Gini coefficients, including income economy-wide and 
group-based component incomes. Our experiments suggest that the labor income  
tax could reduce inequality while the capital income tax could increase it. At the 
disaggregate component income level, capital income inequality increases for all  
three cases.  
4.5 Welfare Comparison of Financing Options  
In this section, we further examine the impact on welfare measured by consumption-
equivalent variation (CEV) with the measure 𝜁 obtained by  
𝜁 =  ∫𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡(𝑠)𝑑𝛷(𝑠)
∫𝑉𝑏𝑚(𝑠)𝑑𝛷(𝑠) 1𝜙(1−𝜇) − 1 (24) 
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where 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡(𝑠) and 𝑉𝑏𝑚 are the value functions of agents in an alternative economy and 
the benchmark economy. ∫𝑉𝑖(𝑠)𝑑𝛷(𝑠) describes the average expected lifetime values 
of all agents in the economy, 𝑖, where 𝑎𝑙𝑡 is the alternative economy and 𝑏𝑚 is the 
benchmark economy.11  
We would like to examine first of all whether UHC could bring better welfare or not, 
given different financing options; and second, determine which type of tax financing is 
best among UHC economies. To answer the first question, we compare the non-UHC 
economies based on the assumptions of different financing options with the benchmark 
economy. The results suggest that an economy without UHC could have higher welfare 
with gains from 1.17% to 1.43% depending on the financing options for the UHC 
economy. In other words, UHC economies are worse off in terms of welfare change 
(see Appendix 2, Table A2.3 for more details).  
The effects on welfare could be attributed to changes in both the level and distribution 
of lifetime utility, which are determined by consumption and leisure. In a UHC 
economy, agents might mostly benefit from a higher level of leisure but might also have 
to accept a lower level of output (and consumption) on average. A negative impact on 
welfare could result when the welfare gain is less than the loss across different social 
groups, taking such individual-level and social distribution effects into account.  
To answer the second question, we construct two more economies financed by 
consumption tax and capital income tax, respectively.12 At the economy-wide level, 
both the consumption tax and the capital income tax are preferred to labor income tax 
with positive values of CEV at 0.14% and 0.15%, respectively. As shown in Table 6, 
such CEV gains are contributed by the more productive high-education group with 
substantial changes of 1.09% and 1.19%, outweighing the losses of the low-education 
group of 0.18% and 0.20% with a larger population size, for the cases of the 
consumption tax financing and the capital income tax financing, respectively. The high-
education young generation also prefers the capital income tax to the labor income tax, 
while the low-education young generation prefers the opposite.  
Table 6: Welfare Consumption-Equivalent Variation Compared  
with Labor Income Tax Financing 
Group Financed by Consumption Tax Financed by Capital Income Tax 
CEV: All 0.14% 0.15% 
CEV: High education 1.09% 1.19% 
 Young generation 1.12% 1.19% 
 Old generation 0.36% 1.39% 
CEV: Low education (0.18%) (0.20%) 
 Young generation (0.21%) (0.26%) 
 Old generation 0.28% 0.70% 
( ) = decrease, CEV = consumption-equivalent variation. 
  
11  See Lucas (1987); Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2013); and Hsu and Yang (2013) for details 
related to the derivation of Equation (24).   
12  An economy without UHC is constructed as shown in Appendix 2, Table A2.1, Column 2, assuming 
labor income is used for financing in the benchmark. Based on this, an economy with UHC financed by 
consumption tax is constructed as shown in Column 5 and an economy with UHC financed by capital 
income tax  is shown in Column 6, Table A2.1.  
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The old generation gains from the alternative economies with either a higher 
consumption tax or a higher capital income tax, compared with the economy with a 
higher labor income tax. Although old people have to be taxed more in the two 
alternative economies compared with the benchmark economy, where the higher labor 
income tax rate does not apply to them, they still have a welfare gain in the higher-tax 
economies. Such gains are largely due to the fact that they rely on asset income  
and pension benefits for living, which depend on factor prices and output. The total 
effects of such factor prices and output are more favorable to the old people in the 
alternative economies.  
The findings above suggest that there are differing welfare implications for people with 
different productivities and ages. While the young people with high productivity prefer 
the capital income tax to the labor income tax, the young people with low productivity 
favor the opposite. Old people are similar to the highly productive young people. So, 
given the population structure, highly productive young people and old people can gain 
more in total than the total loss of the low-productivity young people, and the capital 
income tax, closely followed by the consumption tax, is better than the labor income tax 
in terms of the CEV welfare change.  
Comparing Table 6 with the results of Hsu, Huang, and Yupho (2014), where labor 
supply is exogenous, welfare changes at the group level show a similar sign mostly 
while differing in size when labor is endogenously determined. In cases of consumption 
tax financing or capital income tax financing, the high-education group is much better 
off than with labor income financing, while the low-education group is less worse off. 
Even with a much smaller share of the population, the total gain of the high-education 
group outweighs the loss of the low-education group and results in a net gain for the 
whole economy.  
5. DISCUSSION 
As labor is endogenously determined, young agents can adjust their labor supply  
to maximize their expected utility. Such adjustments are important to buffer against 
shocks and policy changes, including changes to health coverage and the 
corresponding tax rate changes. When labor supply at an aggregate level is reduced 
due to individual reallocation of labor and leisure, social welfare may not improve. If the 
labor supply is exogenous, the impacts on income distribution and social welfare can 
be different without such additional channels for individual optimization.  
The impact on income distribution can be dampened without labor supply adjustment. 
According to our analysis, different UHC financing schemes affect the capital income 
distribution and total income distribution. However, while the signs remain the same, 
the impacts are smaller in magnitude than for the case of endogenous labor. 
Meanwhile, the labor distortions of tax can be reduced substantially without labor 
adjustment. The welfare impact on young agents with high education decreases, while 
the welfare impact on old agents with high education increases. The welfare impact 
turns out to be positive for young and old agents with low education and in aggregation 
the social CEV suggests a net welfare gain in the range of 0.21%–0.27%. Therefore, 
under these circumstances, the characteristics of the labor market, such as the labor 
adjustment of different working groups, could be the key determinants for the outcome 
of social welfare (see more details in Appendix 4).  
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We also examined the sensitivities of education-specific and sector-specific efficiency 
parameters. When either efficiency difference is smaller, the Gini coefficient of total 
income equality also becomes smaller. If there is no difference in sector efficiency, the 
UHC economy financed by labor income tax cannot reduce inequality. Given the lower 
redistribution when efficiency is equalized across education or across sectors, the 
welfare loss to finance a UHC economy could be larger since the gain from 
redistribution to offset the loss of distortion when labor is endogenous is less.  
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we studied a form of universal health coverage financed through 
government tax revenue in the setting of developing countries, where the informal 
economy has a large presence and tax avoidance is not negligible. Meanwhile, thanks 
to the bottom-up approach linking individual behavior to the macro landscape, we allow 
individuals to make decisions given factor prices, while their collective behavior also 
determines factor prices. In addition, linkages between social security expenditure and 
financing sources are also modeled explicitly.  
In such an economy where heterogeneous agents differ by ability, luck, individual work 
effort, and expenditure shocks, and face different levels of tax obligation and social 
security protection, we examined the impacts of UHC at both the aggregate and 
disaggregate levels, on various economic fronts such as labor, capital, output, income 
distribution, and social welfare. We find that the behavior of agents differs in terms of 
labor supply, asset holdings, and consumption, caused by permanent and transitory 
productivity shocks.  
Regarding the impacts on income distribution and welfare, among three tax financing 
options, UHC financed by labor income tax could mitigate income inequality due to its 
large redistributive effect. However, all tax-financed UHC schemes failed to improve 
social welfare when labor is assumed to be endogenous, and the negative impact on 
labor supply could be relatively high. In the absence of such choice of labor supply, 
mild welfare gains could be witnessed for such tax-financed UHC schemes. 
The analytical framework of this paper provides a solid foundation for evaluating a  
set of socioeconomic policies, including social security and taxation policies. It can  
help in the study of policy impacts across different social groups and therefore  
can be extended to political economy models when a voting process is nested into  
the decision-making process. The analysis of both policy formulation process and  
impact could be enriched by taking voting mechanism into consideration, and our 
further research could go in this direction. Meanwhile, the model can be enriched 
further, allowing for labor search and matching, endogenous human capital investment, 
and/or other features. 
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APPENDIX 1: CALIBRATION PROCESS 
1. Employment Transition 
We use the Thai Household Socio-Economic Panel Survey data to construct the 
transitions for the employment and health expenditure shocks. The variable “a_11” is 
used to distinguish the workforce from among all the samples and the variable “f5_1” is 
used to identify workers from the formal and informal sectors. Among the groups, the 
“employer” and “private company employee” groups are the ones where it is difficult to 
tell whether workers are from the formal or informal sector. The employer samples are 
not included since the model is a competitive model with no additional capital rent left 
over for employers. Second, when a worker is employed by a private company, the 
additional information about type of wage “f9_1” is used to serve as a criterion to 
differentiate workers from one sector to the other. The workforce in the formal sector 
consists of people working in government, state enterprises, and private companies 
with regular monthly pay; the workforce of the informal sector consists of people who 
are self-employed without employees, working without pay for a household business, 
and working in private companies without regular monthly pay. Such a strategy of 
differentiating sectors can also be found in Wagstaff and Manachotphong (2012). We 
assume there is a transition bias estimated from the data and calibrate a bias 
parameter, ξ1, for its stationary share of the formal and informal sectors in terms of 
population, for which we target 38% of workers in the formal sector and 62% working in 
the informal sector. 
2. Health Expenditure Transition 
The reported health expenditure was out-of-pocket expenditure. Given the limitations of 
such ex-post data, the following steps are taken to approximate the unobserved 
information. First, a variable with the information on out-of-pocket payments is used, 
“h22” (expenditure on health care), to examine the distribution and transitional 
dynamics. Second, due to the likely mismatch of micro survey data and macro 
indicators, a recovery function is set to match the total health expenditures from the 
benchmark economy to the national total health expenditure per capita. Third, a 
transitory bias is assumed to match the distribution of status of health expenditure with 
its stationary share. We only calculate health expenditure status based on the year 
2005, instead of a 3-year average, since the survey shows that most do not have any 
health insurance scheme and the relative difference between the young and old 
generations is distinct in 2005. Then we use a recovery adjustment function and 
calculate the stationary value of health cost by integrating over the young and old 
generations. In addition, we use this parameter to adjust the total health expenditure to 
match the more recent target of 4% of the 2008–2012 average. The transitory bias 
adjustment is similar to employment status. Tables A1.1 and A1.2 replicate Tables 6 
and 7 of Hsu, Huang, and Yupho (2014) for reference.  
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Table A1.1: Status of Health Expenditure 
Status Range Expenditure (baht) % of Average Income 
Young Generation (𝐗𝐲) 
Low  0%–95% 137.48 1.72 
High  95%–100% 3,871.81 48.44 
Old Generation (𝐗𝐨) 
Low  0%–95% 260.57 3.26 
High  95%–100% 7,821.95 97.86 
Table A1.2: Transition Probabilities of X 
Young (𝛀𝐲) Old (𝛀𝐨) 
  Low  High   Low  High 
Low  0.950 0.050 Low 0.954 0.046 
High 2.942 0.580 High 0.875 0.125 
3. Out-of-Pocket and Total Health Expenditure 
The reform of the health care system to promote universal health coverage started in 
2002. The established National Health Security Office effectively implemented the 
reform in the following years, accompanied by lower private contributions and elevated 
national health expenditure. As shown in Figure A1.1, the out-of-pocket ratio has been 
declining and has been below 15% since 2007. On the other hand, the total health 
expenditure has been rising and stabilized after 2007 at between 3.9% and 4.1% of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Given such a structural change of the health care 
system, we use the more recent data with the average of 2008–2012 as our targets in 
the model economy, in which the total health expenditure is 4% of GDP and the out-of-
pocket ratio was 14% of total health expenditure.  
4. The Components of Tax Revenue 
Personal income tax largely consists of labor income (employment) tax; dividend 
income; and interest income from savings, bonds, etc. However, due to the lack of 
further disaggregated data and the fact that labor income tax accounts for the majority 
of personal income tax, we assume personal income tax revenue is equal to labor 
income tax revenue. Corporate income is assumed to be the same as capital income in 
the model as this is the only source in the model related to capital. Indirect taxes in 
various forms, given that they are ultimately borne by consumers, are therefore 
summed up to be represented as consumption tax in the model. The averages of 
2005–2014 tax revenue as a percentage of GDP—2.2% for labor income, 5.4% for 
capital income, and 10.8% for consumption tax revenue—are the target ratios of the 
benchmark economy in the model.  
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Figure A1.1: Share of Tax Revenues in Thailand 
(% of GDP) 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Thailand. 
5. Capital–Output Ratio and Depreciation Rate  
We define the capital stock at period t, the average of capital stock at the beginning of 
the period and the end of the period (the beginning of next period) by 𝐾�𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡𝑏+𝐾𝑡+1𝑏2 . The 
capital–output ratio is the capital stock divided by the nominal GDP (approximation of 
output) obtained by 𝐾
𝑌
= 𝐾�𝑡
𝑌𝑡
. The depreciation rate is the ratio of the deprecation value 
within period t over the capital stock at the beginning of period t. Given the following 
data, the capital–output ratio and depreciation rate can be calculated. The law of 
motion for capital follows 𝐾𝑡+1𝑏 = 𝐾𝑡𝑏(1 − 𝛿) + 𝐼𝑡. We target the average values of the 
most recent 5 years, which gives a K/Y ratio of 3.4 and a depreciation rate δ of 5.2%.  
Figure A1.2: Capital–Output Ratio and Depreciation Rate 
 
LHS = left-hand scale, RHS = right-hand scale. 
Sources: National Economic and Social Development Board; World Bank World  
Development Indicators. 
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Table A1.3: Variables for Calculating Capital–Output Ratio and Deprecation Rate 
Variables Definition Source 
𝐾𝑡
𝑏(1 − 𝛿) Net capital stock, the value of fixed 
assets after deducting depreciation 
National Economic and Social 
Development Board  
𝐾𝑡
𝑏𝛿 Capital stock depreciation National Economic and Social 
Development Board  
𝑌𝑡 GDP nominal World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
6. Public Debt to GDP Ratio  
The public debt to GDP ratio has been relatively stable across the period. We use the 
average ratio of 2009–2014 as our target in the model, which is 43%.  
Figure A1.3: Public Debt to GDP Ratio 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Thailand. 
7. Population Structure in Thailand 
According to data from the United Nations, Thailand has been experiencing a fast 
aging trend since 2010. The old-age dependency ratio of old people (aged 65+)  
over young people (aged 15–64) will increase sharply in the following decades, from 
12.4% in 2010 to 23.3% in 2025 and reaching 53.1% in 2050. We use the average of 
2009–2014 (the annual figure is estimated through interpolation of the 5-year figures) 
and target 13% in the model.  
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Figure A1.4: Old-Age Dependency Ratio  
(%) 
 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs population estimates and projections. 
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APPENDIX 2: VARIOUS MODEL ECONOMIES 
Table A2.1: Economic Features of Various Economies 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Labor income tax rate (formal) 6.40% 3.82% 6.40% 6.40% 3.82% 3.82% 
Consumption tax rate  16.00% 16.00% 14.80% 14.80% 17.18% 16.00% 
Capital income tax rate  35.00% 35.00% 35.00% 30.65% 35.00% 39.94% 
Aggregate capital per capita 1.2581 1.3187 1.3073 1.3006 1.2708 1.2772 
Aggregate labor per capita 0.2107 0.212 0.2118 0.2103 0.211 0.2126 
Aggregate labor hour per capita 0.3344 0.3361 0.3364 0.3340 0.3342 0.3369 
Interest rate (r) 4.03% 3.78% 3.82% 3.81% 3.98% 3.99% 
Wage rate (w) 1.2027 1.2181 1.2153 1.2159 1.2059 1.205 
Output per capita  0.3696 0.3768 0.3754 0.3731 0.3711 0.3737 
Capital–output ratio (K/Y)  3.4042 3.5000 3.4825 3.4863 3.4240 3.4182 
Total health expenditure (X/Y) 3.99% 3.92% 3.93% 3.96% 3.98% 3.95% 
Fiscal revenue (% of output) 22.22% 21.19% 21.22% 21.34% 22.17% 22.06% 
 – Labor tax 2.18% 1.32% 2.17% 2.18% 1.32% 1.32% 
 – Capital tax 5.47% 5.26% 5.30% 4.58% 5.43% 6.13% 
 – Consumption tax 10.79% 10.79% 9.98% 10.80% 11.59% 10.79% 
 – Social security contribution  3.78% 3.82% 3.77% 3.78% 3.83% 3.82% 
Fiscal outlay (% output) 22.22% 21.18% 21.22% 21.34% 22.17% 22.06% 
 – Old-age pension 3.00% 3.03% 3.00% 3.00% 3.04% 3.04% 
 – Unemployment benefit  0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 
 – Social assist. for cons. floor 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
 – Public health expenditure  3.43% 2.74% 2.75% 2.77% 3.42% 3.40% 
 – Government consumption 14.01% 13.74% 13.78% 13.88% 13.95% 13.86% 
 – Interest payment  1.73% 1.62% 1.64% 1.64% 1.71% 1.71% 
Gini: Labor income (high education) 0.4371 0.437 0.435 0.4363 0.4390 0.4377 
Gini: Labor income (low education) 0.3832 0.3854 0.3823 0.3834 0.3862 0.3849 
Gini: Capital income (high education) 0.4835 0.4801 0.4807 0.4800 0.4828 0.4835 
Gini: Capital income (low education) 0.3945 0.3817 0.3797 0.3801 0.3960 0.3958 
Gini: Total income (social average) 0.3965 0.3982 0.3956 0.3949 0.3990 0.4000 
cons. = consumption, UHC = universal health coverage. 
Notes: (1) is the benchmark UHC economy; (2)–(4) are non-UHC economies assuming the benchmark financed by 
labor income, consumption, and capital income tax, respectively; (5)–(6) are UHC economies financed by consumption 
and capital income tax, constructed from (2) based on the assumption that UHC in (1) is financed by labor income tax. 
Aggregate labor per capita is the effective term, which is the product of labor hours and individual efficiency, compared 
with labor hours. 
Table A2.2: Impact on Income Gini Coefficient 
Group\Option Labor Income Tax Consumption Tax Capital Income Tax 
All (0.43%) 0.23% 0.40% 
High education 0.02% 0.48% 0.18% 
Low education (0.57%) 0.23% (0.05%) 
High education 0.70% 0.58% 0.72% 
Low education 3.24% 3.75% 3.65% 
( ) = decrease. 
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Table A2.3: CEV Welfare Changes without Universal Health Coverage 
Group  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEV: All  1.43% 1.33% 1.17% 0.14% 0.15% 
CEV: High education 2.26% 1.18% 0.93% 1.09% 1.19% 
 – Young generation  2.38% 1.28% 1.05% 1.12% 1.19% 
  – CEV: Formal 2.30% 1.27% 1.05% 1.03% 1.10% 
  – CEV: Informal 2.61% 1.27% 1.04% 1.35% 1.42% 
  – CEV: Ump from formal  2.48% 1.26% 0.01% 1.23% 1.33% 
  – CEV: Ump from informal  2.46% 1.58% 1.31% 0.91% 1.04% 
 – Old generation  (1.22%) (1.62%) (2.65%) 0.36% 1.39% 
CEV: Low education 1.16% 1.38% 1.26% (0.18%) (0.20%) 
 – Young generation  1.18% 1.43% 1.33% (0.21%) (0.26%) 
  – CEV: Formal 0.98% 1.42% 1.33% (0.40%) (0.46%) 
  – CEV: Informal 1.25% 1.43% 1.33% (0.15%) (0.18%) 
  – CEV: Ump from formal  1.63% 1.52% 1.40% 0.15% 0.13% 
  – CEV: Ump from informal  1.18% 1.53% 1.39% (0.32%) (0.31%) 
 – Old generation  0.74% 0.54% 0.05% 0.28% 0.70% 
( ) = decrease, CEV = consumption-equivalent variation, UHC = universal health coverage, ump = unemployed. 
Notes: All compared with the benchmark UHC economy; (2)–(4) are non-UHC economies, assuming the benchmark 
financed by labor income, consumption, and capital income tax, respectively; (5)–(6) are UHC economies financed by 
consumption and capital income tax, compared with UHC economy financed by labor income tax. 
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APPENDIX 3: COMPUTATION PROCEDURE 
The method of dynamic programming is used to provide a numerical solution for the 
model. The steady-state equilibrium is solved by the steps of Aiyagari (1994), which is 
to guess the aggregate values, solve the individual problems, and then simulate the 
economy to update the aggregate values until the guessed values and actual numbers 
converge. In our paper, the individual problems are solved by the endogenous grid 
method proposed by Carroll (2006) and the simulations are conducted through the  
non-stochastic simulations as of Young (2010). The basic procedure is as follows: 
(a) make initial guesses of the aggregate capital, labor, and the endogenous tax 
option to clear the government budget; 
(b) solve the problems of agents in all the state space, which includes education, 
assets, individual productivity, employment, one-period history of employment, 
age, and health expenditure shocks; 
(c) simulate an economy with the decision rules and the transition matrixes  
above, aggregate the distributions of individual asset holdings and labor supply 
for all types to find the aggregate capital and labor, and then calculate the 
endogenous tax rate or government expenditure to clear the government 
budget; 
(d) go back to step (a) and update the guessed values if the convergence criteria 
are not satisfied, and repeat (b)–(d) until the convergence criteria are satisfied.  
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APPENDIX 4: SENSITIVITY TESTS 
1. Economies with Exogenous Labor  
A standard utility function with the endogenous choice of consumption and exogenous 
labor is assumed to be  
𝑢(𝑐) = 𝑐1−𝜇
1−𝜇
. 
We recalibrate the new benchmark economy to match the targets in Table 2 and 
construct the same experiments as the case of endogenous labor. The results are 
shown below.  
In terms of impacts on income distribution for three tax options to finance universal 
health coverage (UHC), the results differ for the case of exogenous labor supply in the 
following, compared with the case of endogenous labor supply. Due to the exogenous 
labor, there is no impact on labor income distribution. It continues to have positive 
impacts on capital income distribution of both education groups for these three tax 
options, albeit with smaller magnitudes.  
At the aggregate level, labor income tax financing could reduce the income Gini 
coefficient by 0.02%, while consumption tax increases it by 0.05%, and capital income 
tax by 0.27%. Such reduction of inequality by labor income tax financing can account 
for the gaps between groups, instead of within groups, where inequality increases.  
Figure A4.1: Impact on Income Gini Coefficient (Exogenous Labor) 
(%) 
 
y_k = capital income. 
The exogeneity of labor supply has a higher impact on welfare. The distortions of tax 
are reduced substantially without labor adjustment. So financing UHC through tax 
neither negatively affects young agents with high education as much as in the 
endogenous case, nor does it positively affect young agents with low education as 
much. The aggregated values show welfare gains when tax-financed UHC schemes 
are implemented. Table A4.1 gives evidence for the welfare changes from the 
counterfactual experiments of removing UHC.   
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Table A4.1: Welfare Changes of Removing Tax-Financed Universal  
Health Coverage (Exogenous Labor) 
Group  (7) (8) (9) 
CEV: All  (0.26%) (0.27%) (0.21%) 
CEV: High education 0.78% 0.00% 0.10% 
 – Young generation  0.95% 0.24% 0.24% 
  – CEV: Formal 0.95% 0.24% 0.24% 
  – CEV: Informal 0.93% 0.23% 0.23% 
  – CEV: Ump from formal  0.98% 0.26% 0.26% 
  – CEV: Ump from informal  1.06% 0.41% 0.40% 
 – Old generation  (3.13%) (2.75%) (3.21%) 
CEV: Low education (0.61%) (0.41%) (0.32%) 
 – Young generation  (0.51%) (0.33%) (0.24%) 
  – CEV: Formal (0.43%) (0.29%) (0.19%) 
  – CEV: Informal (0.55%) (0.36%) (0.26%) 
  – CEV: Ump from formal  (0.27%) (0.21%) (0.09%) 
  – CEV: Ump from informal  (0.28% (0.08%) 0.01% 
 – Old generation  (1.86%) (1.32%) (1.30%) 
( ) = decrease, CEV = consumption-equivalent variation, ump = unemployed. 
Note: (7)–(9) are non-UHC economies, assuming the benchmark financed by labor income, consumption, and capital 
income tax, respectively. 
2. Efficiency Parameters  
To construct such experiments, first of all, the education efficiency is assumed to be 
the same across education levels while holding sector efficiency unchanged. Then, the 
sector efficiency is assumed to be the same across sectors while holding education 
efficiency unchanged. In each case, the counterfactual financing exercises for the  
three finance options are further conducted and compared against their respective 
benchmarks for inequality and welfare. 
By intuition, equalizing efficiency by either education or sector should reduce the 
income inequality. Our experiments suggest the Gini coefficient of total income equality 
falls from 0.3965 to 0.3820 and 0.3764, respectively. As shown from the comparisons 
of each financing option against their benchmarks, when there is no sector efficiency 
difference in the third row of Table A4.2, the UHC economy financed by labor income 
tax loses its redistributive role to reduce inequality. Instead, the inequality increases.  
Table A4.2: Changes of Income Gini Coefficient 
Group  
Labor Income  
Tax Rate 
Consumption  
Tax Rate  
Capital Income  
Tax Rate  
𝜀𝑛𝑓 = 0.7,𝜖𝑙 = 0.7273 (0.43%) 0.23% 0.40% 
𝜀𝑛𝑓 = 0.7, 𝜖𝑙 = 1 (0.65%) 0.08% 0.31% 
𝜀𝑛𝑓 = 1, 𝜖𝑙 = 0.7273 0.85% 0.16% 0.32% 
( ) = decrease. 
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Regarding consumption-equivalent variation welfare changes, given the lower 
redistribution when efficiency is equalized across education level or sector, the welfare 
loss should be bigger due to lower gains from redistribution to offset the loss of 
distortion. Therefore, a non-UHC economy with a lower tax is strictly better off, and 
more so when there is less efficiency difference. Especially when the sector efficiency 
disappears, the size of the welfare loss by financing UHC through labor income is large 
(Table A4.3). 
Table A4.3: CEV Welfare Changes without UHC (Equalizing Efficiency) 
Group  Labor Income Tax Consumption Tax Capital Income Tax 
𝜀𝑛𝑓 = 0.7,𝜖𝑙 = 0.7273 1.43% 1.33% 1.17% 
𝜀𝑛𝑓 = 0.7, 𝜖𝑙 = 1 1.64% 1.47% 1.31% 
 𝜀𝑛𝑓 = 1, 𝜖𝑙 = 0.7273 2.85% 1.54% 1.44% 
CEV = consumption-equivalent variation, UHC = universal health coverage. 
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